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Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of education networks on the FDI from
the United States and United Kingdom to 167 countries during 1999–2011.
Proxies of networks are international students in the United States and United
Kingdom and American and British alumni associations abroad. Results show
that international students boost British FDI, while their influence on American
FDI is weaker and restricted to non-OECD economies. International alumni
associations strongly attract both American and British FDI to the alumni
home countries. The different impact of education networks on American and
British FDI is partly related to the two countries’ use of soft and hard power. The
pro-FDI effects of student ties are disrupted by the use of hard power.
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1 Introduction
According to UNESCO’s definition and statistics, international students are
students who move to a foreign country for the purpose of tertiary studies.1
They were 50.000 in 1950, 2.1 million in 2002, and 3.4 million in 2010. This huge
growth in numbers has stimulated debate and research on its causes and, partly,
also on its consequences. In recent years, the economic research has focused on
students’ motivations to move abroad, universities’ incentives to attract foreign
students (Bessey 2012; Beine, Romain, and Lionel 2012 ; Kahanec and Králiková
2011; Haupt, Krieger, and Lange 2011; Van Bouwel and Veugelers 2010), and
human capital gains and losses for destination and home countries (Le 2010;
Chellaraj, Maskus, and Mattoo 2008; Freeman 2010). Only few studies consider
*Corresponding author: Marina Murat, Department of Economics, University of Modena and
Reggio Emilia, Viale Berengario 51 Modena, Modena, Modena 41121, Italy,
E-mail: marina.murat@unimore.it
1 When ‘foreign students’ is used in this paper, the meaning remains that of students moving
abroad for the purpose of university studies.
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another, important, effect of international movements: their bridging potential
in terms of economic, political and cultural links between origin and destination
countries. Among these, Spilimbergo (2009) measures the influence of foreign
education on countries’ political systems, and (Murat 2014) tests the effects of
international students on bilateral trade.
The education ties developed by international students during the years at
university and their effects on FDI are the subject of this study. Student ties,
based on friendship, mutual trust and attachment to the alma mater, tend to be
quite robust and enduring (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Moreover, inter-
national students possess a specific knowledge on the institutions, culture and
social norms of host and home countries. Education networks, as the wider
category of social networks, channel valuable information on economic oppor-
tunities abroad and provide social control on the potentially opportunistic
behaviour of members. In them, however, these mechanisms are likely to be
especially effective. Their participants, by being skilled individuals, linked to a
common alma mater and endowed with valuable transnational human and
social capital, can obtain above average gains by sharing their knowledge, but
also face substantial losses by behaving opportunistically.
Destination countries sometimes see international students as a vehicle for
improving diplomatic and political relations with their home countries. In this
perspective, foreign students are a form of soft power. Nye (2005) defines soft
power as the capacity of influencing the preferences of others through persua-
sion and attraction, rather than through coercion or payment. Among various
forms of soft power, the transmission of cultural and political standards through
education proves to be particularly effective. Soft power exerted through inter-
national students aims at the elites of foreign countries, and is expected to
influence countries’ politics, institutions, and economy.
This paper tests the influence of university ties on countries’ bilateral
economic exchanges, in particular, on the foreign direct investments (FDI)
from the United States and United Kingdom into 167 students’ home countries.
The United States and the United Kingdom are the two main destinations of
international students worldwide. In 2010, 21% and 12% of all international
students were attending American and British universities (UNESCO). The
analysis is based on panel data on FDI, international students and other
covariates, from year 1999 to 2011. Cross sections on students who attended
university during 1970 are also used. They measure the effects of mature
individuals with American or British education on the bilateral FDI of 1999–
2011. Another, more direct indicator of active networking activity is the number
of alumni associations of United States and United Kingdom universities in
each foreign country. Alumni associations are a common phenomenon of
2 M. Murat
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/30/16 10:19 PM
universities of English-speaking countries; often their branches spread to
many locations worldwide. As no official statistics on their numbers exist, I
collected the evidence provided by universities’ websites or kindly supplied by
the universities themselves. With these figures I built two novel databases on
the alumni associations of American and British universities in the 167 partner
countries considered.
This study contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. First, by
using an augmented gravity model, it tests the effects of education networks on
foreign direct investments. Second, it tests whether these effects vary as other
forms of power are used by destination countries. In particular, I consider forms
of soft power, such as Aid or cultural diplomacy, and of hard power, such as
wars or covert action. While data on Aid and wars are available from both
destination countries, data on cultural diplomacy are available only from the
United Kingdom and on covert action from the United States. Previous expecta-
tions are that all kinds of soft power, by increasing trust between countries
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009), have a positive effect on bilateral FDI, that
wars have a negative influence (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008), and covert
action has a positive one (Berger et al., 2013). These alternative forms of power
are also expected to alter, positively or negatively, the pro-FDI effects of inter-
national students.
The main findings of this paper are that the effects of international students
on bilateral FDI are positive and strong for the United Kingdom and positive but
weaker for the United States. Regarding the latter, they are restricted to non-
OECD partner countries. On the other hand, alumni associations strongly attract
both American and British FDI to the alumni home economies. Wars and covert
action reduce the positive effects of student ties on FDI. These results are robust
to different regressors and dependent variables. The remainder of the paper is
structured as follows: section 2 presents some main facts and the literature on
social and education networks. Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics and
the sources of data. The estimation strategy is developed in successive steps is in
Section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 gives the
conclusions.
2 Facts and Literature
International students and scholars, together with literature and classical music,
are forms of soft power directed to the elites. Hosting foreign students and
scholars is often considered a very effective way of influencing the politics
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and the economy of foreign countries.2 At the other extreme, hard power is the
use of force through wars, military coercion, or economic blockades. Espionage
and covert action are usually classified as hard power, even though their
influence on foreign countries is less clear Nye (2005). Hard power is thought
to deploy its consequences in the short run, while soft power is supposed to
have long-lasting consequences. An often debated point is whether or not soft
power without the backing of force can actually be effective. Nye names smart
power the wise combination of the two.
The view that international students can be useful for influencing foreign
nations is not new. Back in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Britain
hosted students from all over the world. There were fewer students from poor
countries than from rich ones, but the bridging potential of the former was seen
as the most important and precious, since economic relations with rich and
settlement countries were already well established (Pietsch 2013 ). In turn,
students from poor countries moved to study in Britain because this could
lead to prestigious jobs when returning to the home country, especially in the
professions, commerce and bureaucracy. In later decades, some of the leaders of
decolonization and independence had been at school and university in the
colonial country (Spilimbergo 2009; Perraton 2014).
After the second world war, the economic and political influence of the United
States overcame that of the United Kingdom. By becoming a superpower, the
United States became also a preferred destination of international students.
However, it had to compete with another superpower, the Soviet Union, which
was also interested into attracting students from abroad in order to exert its own
international influence. With the world divided into two separate blocks, each
superpower offered scholarships and fellowships to foreign students and scholars
(Perraton 2014; Spilimbergo 2009; Pietsch 2013). As before, of special interest were
students originating from Third World countries, but now the main motivation was
to keep these countries from falling under the influence of the competing nation.
Hence, the main goal of American and Soviet authorities was firstly political,
economic interests came second (Brawner and Lucas 2007). The Cold War, and
the ever-present possibility of a devastating armed confrontation between the two
superpowers, made the use of cultural persuasion and soft power necessary.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of the world into
two contending blocks, the political and economic world scenario became
gradually more heterogeneous and fragmented. During the nineties, perhaps
because of its role of unique leading nation, the interest of the United States on
2 In Hurn and Tomalin (2013) the view of British policy makers in favour of attracting students
to order to improve relations with their home countries is clearly stated.
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foreign students faded, and the funds dedicated to international scholarships
gradually shrank (Brawner and Lucas 2007). Later, after the terrorist attacks of
September 2001, the country adopted restrictive entry policies regarding immi-
gration, which included foreign students.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United Kingdom maintained more open
policies on foreign students for a longer time. During the empire, the British
government was interested into attracting foreign students to improve interna-
tional relations; after the second world war, perhaps because of the lost supre-
macy, this interest even increased. It lasted until 2010, when measures on
international students, entry visas, grants and scholarships became more restric-
tive (Perraton 2014).
In seeing international students as a potential vehicle of soft power, govern-
ments implicitly rely on the attachment students tend to develop for their
university friends and mates, the alma mater and the hosting country.
Specifically on the friendship ties built at university, Marmaros and Sacerdote
(2006), Mayer and Puller (2008), Arcidiacono, Khan, and Vigdor (2011), Baker,
Mayer, and Puller (2011), Neri and Ville (2008), find that they tend to be
particularly robust. These studies are based on data from American colleges
and universities. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) test the investment deci-
sions of individuals who can place their investments either with former univer-
sity mates or with anonymous partners, and find that university mates are
significantly preferred. This suggests that university ties are be long-lasting,
and can gradually develop into business links.
Students’ friendship and network ties belong in the wider class of social
networks. A branch of the literature analyses the effect of social networks on the
economic exchanges (Granovetter 1973). The base assumption of networks’
theory is that social interactions between individuals, through information-
diffusing and behaviour-enforcing mechanisms, lower the fixed costs of market
transactions. At the international level, fixed costs are increased by social,
cultural, and institutional dissimilarities between countries. People living out-
side their home country can share information on economic opportunities
abroad, and help to smooth-out dissimilarities between home and destination
economies. By lowering the fixed costs of international transactions, they can
boost bilateral trade and FDI between (Rauch 1999, 2001). Several studies,
mostly based on data on international migrants, provide empirical support for
these hypothesis. After the seminal work by Gould (1994) and Head and Ries
(1998) numerous authors measure the impact of migrant networks on bilateral
trade. Among others, Wagner, Head, and Reis (2002), Combes, Lafourcade, and
Mayer (2005), Herander and Saavedra (2005), Blanes and Martín-Montaner
(2006), White (2007), Tadesse and White (2008) Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin,
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and Wall (2008), Buch, Kleinert, and Toubal (2006), Peri and Requena (2010),
Aleksynska and Peri (2014), Egger, Ehrlich, and Nelson (2012), Felbermayr and
Toubal (2012). A related set of studies test the relation between international
networks and bilateral FDI (Gao 2003; Tong 2005). Some results show that FDI
are more likely to be promoted by networks of skilled individuals than from
average ones (Docquier and Lodigiani 2010; Javorcik et al. 2011; Flisi and Murat
2011). Regarding the dissimilarity-smoothing role of networks, Girma and Yu
(2002), Dunlevy (2006), Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Tong (2005) provide sup-
port to the thesis that the effects of network ties are stronger on the economic
exchanges between less similar countries. Finally, regarding the soft power
exerted through international students, Spilimbergo (2009) finds that democracy
in destination countries is positively transmitted to the students’ home coun-
tries. Nye (2005) provides descriptive evidence on improvements in political and
institutional relations between origin and destination countries.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This paper uses three proxies for education networks: International students, who
are students that attended American and British universities during 1999–2011,
International students1970, who attended university during the academic years 1970,
and the number of Alumni associations of American and British universities in
foreign countries. The two variables, International students and International stu-
dents1970, concern stocks of international students registered during each academic
year. Alumni associations, a more direct proxy of networking activity, is time-
invariant. It reports the decision of former students of a certain university to create
a formal group, remain linked to the alma mater, meet on regular basis, and
exchange news and information on issues of common interest. More than student
ties, associations are likely to convey valuable economic knowledge and informa-
tion on foreign markets, which can influence foreign investments.
For the purpose of this investigation, I collected the information available
on universities’ websites on alumni associations during year 2012, with which I
built two variables, one concerning 1759 American, and the other 1895 British
associations. They are the foreign branches of the associations of alumni of 62
American and 50 British universities.3 These data show that associations are
3 Data on associations abroad were collected from all university websites that provided this
information during year 2012. The staff of Manchester University (United Kingdom) kindly
provided data. The databases on the American and British foreign branches of alumni associa-
tions are available from the author on request.
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present in all continents and many countries. Figures on the number of members
of each association were seldom available, but some universities’ websites
report alumni numbers that are tens or hundreds of thousands. For example,
in the alumni website of Oxford University was written ‘There are currently more
than 200,000 Oxford alumni in over 88 countries (about one-third are based
overseas)’. Interestingly, the alumni associations of business schools are often
kept distinct from all other alumni.4 The spread and importance of all kind of
alumni associations abroad is related to the long history of university alumni in
the United States and, more recently, in the United Kingdom. Some American
associations of alumni are as old as or older than their alma mater.
Data on International students show that their presence in the United States
grew constantly until 2000–2001. It decreased after 2001, except for students
originating from Asia (Figure 1(a)). Patterns are different in the United Kingdom,
where the presence of students from all regions increased steadily during the
period 1987–2011 (Figure 1(b)), except for a lower growth from 1999 from Europe,
and from 2005 from North America. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) depict American and
British outward FDI from 1987 to 2001. American FDI abroad grew constantly
from 1987 to 2011, except for the years following the financial crisis of 2008,
when the FDI to Asia fell. Investments to Oceania, on which data are more
scarce, were lower in 2005 than in 1999. On the other hand, during the period
considered, British investments grew in all world areas.
Figure 3 shows that the proportion of international students in the United
States on world totals decreases constantly since the end of the eighties. This
can be explained by the diminished interest of the country on international
students after the Cold War, and by other destinations becoming more attractive
for students. The contraction in the Unites States is more pronounced after 2002,
when not only the proportion, but also absolute number of students fall as an
4 Business alumni associations of Harvard, Stanford, Oxford, Rutgers, Penn state and several
other universities have their distinct offices and websites. On the Alumni website of Penn State
University is written: ‘The Penn State community includes more than 610,000 alumni located in
every corner of the world. Within that network, graduates of the Smeal College of Business
number more than 74,000.’ More specifically, the number of Penn State Alumni with Penn State
Alumni Association Membership is more than 172,000, about 30.% of the total’. If the same
proportion is applied to Smeal College, then registered members of business alumni associa-
tions are about 23.000. If only one third of all associate alumni are abroad (using the proportion
of Oxford alumni abroad), then there are 52,460 associated alumni, of whom 6,780 business
alumni, of Penn State University alone in foreign countries. Some Alumni associations of the
London Business School membership numbers are: 2,399 in China, 4,307 in India, 3,900 in
other Asian countries, 1,275 in Australia and New Zealand, 2,158 in Brazil, 2,782 in other Latin
American countries, 2,502 in Africa, over 1,300 in the Middle East, 1,694 in eastern Europe,
1,930 in France, 544 in Greece.
Students and Investments Abroad 7
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/30/16 10:19 PM
effect of the country’s restrictive policies on students’ visas. The same share in
the United Kingdom follows a quite different path: increasing until the end of
the nineties, and becoming flat or decreasing only slightly afterwards. Given the
rapid increase in the world number of international students, even to the flat
part corresponds a positive growth in levels.
Up to this point, geographic areas rather than the level of development of
countries have been considered. However, differences in development become
relevant in relation to the hypothesis that social links matter more between more
dissimilar economies. Moreover, as seen above, governments of destination
countries often see students as vehicles for soft power, and students originating
from developing and Third World economies as those endowed with the
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
(a)
(b)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Africa North America South America Europe Oceania Asia (right hand Y)
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Africa North America South America Oceania Asia (right hand Y) Europe (right hand Y)
Figure 1: (a) International students in United States. 1987–2011, (b) International students in
United Kingdom. 1987–2011.
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strongest bridging potential. In what follows, OECD economies will represent
developed countries, and non-OECD economies less developed countries. Table 1
shows that during 1999–2011 the majority of international students in American
and British universities originate from other developed – OECD – countries.
Specifically, students from the average developed (OECD) economy in the
United States are more than twice of those from the developing (non-OECD)
country, while in the United Kingdom this proportion is about four to one.
However, student numbers from non-OECD economies grow more rapidly.
During the period considered, the number of students from developing countries
increased at a rate of 11.2% per year in the United States and 9.75% in the United
Kingdom, while the growth rates from developed economies were about 3% in
both the United States and United Kingdom. Figures 1(a,b) show that the rapid
growth rate in the United States is driven especially by Asian students, while in
the United Kingdom the number of students from Asia and Africa grow rapidly.
The distribution of Alumni associations is similar to that of international students:
largest numbers belong to OECD countries.
Table 1 also shows that, similarly to international students, American and
British multinationals invest especially in other developed (OECD) countries, but
also that FDI in developing economies grow more rapidly. Figure 2(a), (b) show
that the fastest growth rates concern Asian countries. Detailed definitions and
sources of all variables and data utilized in this paper are listed in Table 6.
4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Baseline Specification
The basic question I seek to examine is whether international students in United
States and United Kingdom and alumni abroad influence the volume of FDI from
the two host countries to the students’ home countries. To do so, I firstly
estimate the following gravity base model (Feenstra 2004):
ln FDIct = α+ δ ln Education networksct +Xct+ αt + εct [1]
where the dependent variable is the stock of outward FDI of the United
States or United Kingdom in country c at time t. The explanatory variable of
interest is Education networks. Its proxies are, respectively, the stocks of
International students from country c at time t present in the United States or
United Kingdom and the stocks of Alumni associations of American or British
universities in country c. International students1970, students who attended
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university at the beginning of the seventies are also considered. Data are from
years 1999 to 2011.
Xct is a vector including several variables, specific to the partner country c,
commonly used in the literature on FDI determinants. They are: GDP, a proxy for
the purchasing power of consumers in the partner country; Population size to
capture the potential market size of the country; Distance of the country from the
Unites States or United Kingdom to account for transaction costs related to
travel, communications and cultural distance; the average Inflation in country
c at time t to control for macroeconomic stability; a time-varying index of the
Quality of institutions, to proxy the bureaucratic and political costs of transac-
tions; the proportion of people speaking English, to denote cultural similarities
and possibility of obtaining information about business conditions; and Free
trade agreements between the United States or the United Kingdom and the
partner country. The model includes time dummies, αt. All variables, except
dummies and percentages are in logarithms. Countries fixed effects are added in
further specification, where time-invariant cofactors are not included.5
4.2 Endogeneity
The proxy for education networks International students1970, concerning former
students, who attended university about three decades before the time of the
FDI, can be safely thought to be uncorrelated with the error terms of eq. [1].
Moreover, as seen above (Section 2), part of these students were accepted in
American and British universities because of soft power reasons, unrelated to
economic considerations. Alumni associations might in principle suffer from
endogeneity problems, but they are a longer run phenomenon than international
students. Hence, also in this case, endogeneity can be ruled out.
On the other hand, coefficients on International students can suffer from
reverse causality, omitted variable bias, or measurement error. To try to obviate
for these problems, I estimate this variable’s effects on trade by using the
Blundell and Bond (1998) System GMM in levels and differences, and include
the lagged dependent variable among regressors to account for hysteresis in FDI.
The model specification is now based on one equation in first differences and
one in levels. For the former the instruments used are the lagged levels of
variables and for the latter the instruments are the lagged differences:
5 The number of country-time dummies would be 2171 (167 countries × 13 years), hence, they
cannot be added among regressors because of insufficient observations.
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dln FDIct = α+ βdln FDIct − 1 + δdln Education networksct + dXct+ αt + εct [2a]
and
ln FDIct = α+ βln FDIct − 1 + δln Education networksct +Xct+ αt + εct [2b]
where d denotes first differences. The Sys-GMM specification, by including the
lagged bilateral FDI, controls for the time-varying component of countries’
effects (Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman 2009).
4.3 Soft, Covert and Hard Power
The worldwide economic and political importance of the two destination coun-
tries differ enough to affect the capacity of the respective multinationals of
accessing foreign markets. Hence, potential omitted variables in the above
specification should relate to alternative forms of power or persuasion used by
the United States and United Kingdom in their interactions with other countries.
Given that international students can in turn represent a form of soft power, the
interactions of the above factors with International students are also of interest.
Hence, to the above specification, I add, first, two covariates representing,
respectively, the use of soft power or force. One is the amount of economic aid
(in millions of United States $) provided by each destination economy to the
partner country, the other is the number of wars fought with it since the end of
the second world war. As aid can improve the trust of people on the donor
country, it can be considered a form of soft power. Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2009) find that higher levels of trust between people of two different
countries positively affect the bilateral economic exchanges between the coun-
tries. At the same time, aid can also affect FDI by positively influencing the
preferences of consumers for goods of the donor country. Moreover, aid provi-
sions are often accompanied by bilateral trade and, in some cases, investment
treaties (Selaya and Sunesen 2012). For similar and opposite reasons, the num-
ber of wars fought with the foreign country are expected to have a direct
disruptive influence on trade and FDI (Barbieri and Levy 1999; Martin, Mayer,
and Thoenig 2008) and an indirect effect through the weakening of trust and
social ties – including education ties – between people in the two countries.
While the effect of wars is expected to be negative, it must also be considered
that after the second world war, wars have been increasingly fought for political
or humanitarian reasons, rather than for military victories over the ‘enemy
country’, and, especially regarding the United Kingdom, together with a wide
coalition of countries. The effects on bilateral FDI of these locally and
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temporarily limited wars can therefore be less disruptive that those of more
traditional ones. This makes the coefficient on the Wars variable more difficult
to sign a priory.
I then add two covariates, one in the regressions concerning the United
States and the other in those concerning the United Kingdom. In the first, I
include a variable on the use of covert power. Both the United States and the
United Kingdom governments rely on the services of secret intelligence agencies
operating in foreign countries, and indicators of their activities for both coun-
tries would be useful for the purpose of this study, but only the American
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has made information on past operations
publicly available. Using these data, Berger et al. (2013) find that, during the
Cold War years, 1945 to 1989, CIA interventions in foreign countries had a
positive impact on United States exports to those countries. They also find that
the effect is higher with less democratic countries. In this paper I use the data
made available by Berger et al. to test the impact of the number of CIA opera-
tions in the foreign country from 1945 to 1989 on American investments in the
country after the Cold War, during 1999–2011. Hence, differently than Berger
et al., I test the effect of past CIA operations on FDI, rather than of CIA opera-
tions on exports of the same time period. Following Berger et al. (2013) the
coefficient on CIA could be expected to take a positive value, but following
Nye (2005), and his thesis on covert intervention being in fact hard power, it
should take a negative one.
In the regressions on data from the United Kingdom, I add a proxy for
cultural diplomacy: the number of branches of the British Council in the foreign
country. The British Council professed goal is of disseminating abroad the
culture and language of the United Kingdom, and of building trust between
people of the United Kingdom and other countries. Its website clearly describes
the soft power component of this task. Specifically, it states that the British
Foreign Office endorses ‘the British Council’ as an ‘invaluable part of United
Kingdom’s soft power armoury’. The British Council provides useful information
and practical services to students wishing to study in Britain, and other people
wishing to know the United Kingdom. Other countries with similar institutions
are France with the Alliance Francaise, Germany, with the Goethe Institut, Italy,
with the Dante Alighieri Association, Spain, with the Instituto Cervantes, China,
with the Confucius Institute. A corresponding variable cannot be added in the
regressions on United States’ data because there isn’t a recognized American
institution devoted to cultural diplomacy. The coefficient on the British Council
variable is expected to be positive.
The variables Aid, British Council, CIA and Wars, by being expressions of
soft, covert and hard power, can be all be expected to affect FDI and also to be
14 M. Murat
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potentially correlated with International students. In particular, hard and covert
power, having disruptive effects on the relations between countries, should
weaken the positive influence of education links on FDI. On the other hand,
soft power factors, such as Aid or British Council, should be positively correlated
with FDI, but their interaction with International students cannot be signed a
priory. It will be positive if the two have a complementary influence on trade,
and negative if they substitute each other.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Specification: OLS and FE
Table 2 depicts the coefficients of the baseline regressions and evidence three
main results. First, the impact of International students is positive, stronger and
more robust on British than on American bilateral FDI. Second, international
students who attended American and British universities during the beginning
of the seventies, International students1970, mature workers and professionals
during the FDI timespan, have a positive and significant influence on both
American and British FDI. Third, Alumni associations have a stronger and
more significant influence on FDI than international students.
More specifically, regarding the baseline specification of regression (1),
coefficients on International students in the United Kingdom regressions are
positive, high and significant in all specifications, while they are not significant
in the United States regressions. In Model 6 of Table 2, a 1% increase in the
number of students originating from country c increases the British FDI in
country c by 0.32%; with significance at 1%. The magnitude of the coefficient
shrinks to 0.18 when countries’ fixed effects are added to the model (Model 9).
Hence, the relation between international students in the United Kingdom and
the British FDI investments in the students’ home countries is positive and
significant, with a magnitude varying between 0.18 and 0.32.
International students1970 have a similar, positive and significant influence
on both American and British investments abroad. Specifically, a 1% increase
in International students1970 in the partner country improves the American FDI
in the country by 0.26% and the British FDI by 0.22%. Significance in both
cases is at 1% (Models 2 and 7 in Table 2). Hence, university ties built at the
beginning of the seventies by individuals who are in their maturity during
1999–2011 show to be still alive, and strongly affect the bilateral FDI. In
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particular, their effects on United States’ FDI are stronger and more significant
than those of more recent cohorts. At first sight, the result regarding the United
States could be due to a different composition of countries of students and FDI
between 1970 and 1999–2011: communist countries were underrepresented
during the Cold War, while they are among the first in terms of students’
numbers in American universities and, regarding specifically Asia, of
American FDI. However, a similar change has taken place in students in
Britain and British FDI abroad, without leading to the same result. As Table
2 shows, the British bilateral FDI are positively and significantly influenced by
both old and recent cohorts of international students. A more likely explana-
tion for the non-significant effect of recent networks on the American FDI is the
stagnation and fall in student inflows in the country after 2001 (Figure 1(a)).
The Alumni associations of both American and British universities exert a
strong power of attraction on the American and British FDI in the alumni home
countries. Specifically, a 1% increase in Alumni associations boosts the
American FDI by almost 0.82% (Model 3, Table 2), and the same increase in
the number of alumni associations of British universities increases the British
FDI by 0.72% (Model 8). In both cases significance is at 1%. The positive and
significant effect of Alumni on the American FDI, different from that of inter-
national students, may be explained by associations being a longer run phe-
nomenon. Also, they are a closest proxy for active networking activity than
stocks of international students. Furthermore, alumni are individuals with a
foreign education, living in their home countries and with above-average
salaries and occupations. Hence, alumni associations are more effective than
student networks in channelling valuable economic information on economic
opportunities abroad, and in enforcing control mechanisms on the behaviour
of members.
Control variables, GDP, Population and Distance bear the expected signs.
Inflation appears to be uncorrelated to the British investments abroad, but has a
positive and significant correlation with American FDI. This is due perhaps to the
relatively greater amount of investments from the this country into Latin America
and other economies characterized by low macroeconomic stability. The Quality
of institutions is strongly correlated with the United Kingdom investments abroad
(Model 8, Table 2) and not significant for the United States FDI. In turn, this
result may be due to the relatively high amount of British investments in the
European Union and in countries of the Commonwealth, a factor that is con-
trolled for in the fixed effects regressions of Models 4 and 9. A higher percentage
of people speaking English in the foreign country makes the country more
attractive for both American and British outward FDI (Models 1–3 and 6–8).
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A usual matter of concern in the literature on FDI is that the variable may
contain many zeroes. In this study FDI are stocks rather than flows, and the
proportion of zeroes is not high: about 20% of all observations, both for the
United Kingdom and the United States. However, a consequence of taking logs is
that the conversion of zero FDI into missing values may introduce selection bias
and cause loss of valuable information. To deal with this problem, as several
other authors, I sum one to all FDI values before taking logs. As this procedure,
in turn, may inflate coefficients, I re-ran all regressions without the adjustment.
Results do not change significantly and are available upon request.
5.2 Endogeneity: System GMM
Coefficients on International students estimated with OLS can suffer from endo-
geneity bias. Hence, I rerun the regression using the Blundell-Bond System GMM
estimator in levels and differences. To control for hysteresis, I also add the
lagged value of the dependent variable among regressors (eq. [2a] and [2b]).
Results in Table 2 obtained with the Sys-GMM estimator confirm and reinforce
previous findings (Models 5 and 10). Student networks have a high and signifi-
cant impact on the bilateral British FDI, and a lower and non-significant influ-
ence on the American FDI. A 1% increase in the number of International students
in the United Kingdom leads to an improvement of 0.29% of the British FDI to
the students’ home countries. As expected, the value of this GMM coefficient lies
between values 0.33 and 0.18 of the OLS Models 6 and 9 in Table 2 (Roodman
2009). Hansen tests confirm the validity of results. The same coefficient in the
regression concerning the United States FDI is positive but not significant
(Model 5).
5.3 Soft, Covert and Hard Power
The different geopolitical roles played by the United States and United
Kingdom on the international stage can affect the way in which American
and British multinationals enter foreign markets, and the importance of educa-
tion networks in this process. Hence, I add to the above specification two
covariates. The first, Aid, meant as soft power, is the quantity of aid transfers
(in US$) provided to the foreign country, and the second, Wars, indicating the
use of force, is the number of wars fought with the foreign country since 1945.
Subsequently, in the regressions on United States data, I add the number of
CIA interventions in the partner country during the Cold War period, 1945–
Students and Investments Abroad 19
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/30/16 10:19 PM
1989, and, in the regressions concerning the British FDI, I include the number
of British Council branches in the foreign country. The first is a proxy for covert
power, while the second is a further proxy for soft power, in the form of
cultural diplomacy. Both variables are expected to affect FDI directly, and
indirectly through their interactions with International students.
Results in Table 3 show that the Total effect of Aid on bilateral FDI is non-
significant in both the United States and United Kingdom regressions (Models
1 and 6). However, regarding the United States, the interaction between Aid
transfers and International students appears to have a positive effect: the
coefficient on International students × Aid is low but positive, and is signifi-
cant at the 10% level (Model 1). For the United States, the two kinds of soft
power complement each other. The coefficient on the same interaction is
instead negative in the regressions on British data: in this case, the two
forms of soft power are substitutes. Another proxy for soft power is the
cultural diplomacy exerted by the United Kingdom through the British
Council. In this case, differently than expected, the coefficient on the Total
effect of British Council is non-significant. Not significant is also the coeffi-
cient on the interacted variable, International students × British Council. The
raw data show that, despite a declared aim of the British Council is to attract
potential international students to universities in the United Kingdom, the
simple correlation between British Council and International students is just
0.28, while the correlation between British Council and Alumni is 0.21. These
results suggest that the United Kingdom uses different forms of soft power in
different world areas.
Wars are the opposite of soft power: they should disrupt social and
economic relations (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008) between countries.
However, results show that the Total effect of Wars on British FDI is positive
and significant (Model 6, Table 3). This may be explained by the fact that, after
the second world war, the United Kingdom has participated mostly into armed
conflicts having political and humanitarian. Results show that the same coeffi-
cient is not significant when the dependent variable is the United States’ FDI
(Model 2). The interaction between wars and international students is as
expected: armed conflicts reduce the positive effects of education ties on
investments. The coefficient on the interacted variable International students
× Wars is negative both for the United States and the United Kingdom, but it is
significant only for the latter. Interestingly, the United States coefficient on the
interacted term becomes negative and significant if Vietnam (an outlier in
terms of years of war, but among the top fifteen countries in terms of foreign
students in American universities) is excluded from the panel. This suggests
that students from Vietnam compensate for the disruptive effects of war on the
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relations between the two countries. The negative effect of wars on education
networks is further reinforced if also South Korea is excluded from the United
States sample.
Regarding covert power, results show that the Total effect of CIA interven-
tions during the Cold War years on American FDI is non-significant (Model 3,
Table 3). This partially differs from Berger et al. (2013), who find a positive
effect of CIA on exports. One explanation for the present result can be it
concerns the impact of covert power on FDI and not on trade. However,
trade and FDI are aspects of the more general economic exchanges with the
foreign country, and effects on them could be expected to be similar. Another,
more likely, reason, is that Berger et al. measure the effects of CIA interven-
tions on the same period trade flows, while this study tests their effects on FDI
at later time, during 1999–2011. Years 1999–2011 differ from the Cold War era
in significant ways. One is that during the Cold War CIA interventions in
communist countries were strongly limited, while now these countries are
origin of international students or destination of American multinationals, or
both. Some of the economies listed among the top 20 FDI destinations, such as
China, the Russian Federation or Kazakhstan, were not there before 1989.
However, and more importantly, as expected, the joint impact of CIA with
education networks, International students × CIA, is negative and significant
(Model 3). This suggests that education ties are weakened in countries where
there were more CIA interventions, and, in general, that even in the long run
the use of covert power diminishes the positive influence of soft power.
Differently from Nye (2005), who assumed that hard power had short run
effects and soft power a long run impact, hard power in the form of covert
action can have long-lasting effects.
Table 3 also shows that, regarding the United States, the Total effect of
International students is positive and significant in Models 2 and 3 (not in
Model 1). Up to now, these are the only specifications in which the overall effect
of education networks on American FDI is positive. The effect, however, is
positive only when the interactions of students with Wars and CIA are controlled
for. In Model 4, with the same number of observations and including all
covariates but not the interacted variables, the coefficient on International
students turns again to be non-significant. Differently, regarding the United
Kingdom, coefficients on the Total effect of International students and on
International students are always positive and significant (Models 6–9), with
magnitudes that remain similar to those obtained with the previous specifica-
tions of Table 2. This confirms the robustness of results on the United Kingdom
education ties.
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5.4 Developed and Developing Partner Countries
One hypothesis of networks theory is that network effects on economic
exchanges are stronger between less similar countries (Dunlevy 2006).
Therefore, to test whether the incidence of education networks linked to less
developed partners differ from their overall effect, OECD countries are excluded
from the sample in Models 5 and 10 of Table 3. Results, in this case, are that
student networks linked to more dissimilar – less developed – countries, posi-
tively and significantly attract American FDI to the home economies (Model 5).
This provides support to the hypothesis on dissimilarity. Specifically, a 1%
increase in students from a non-OECD country rises the American FDI to the
country by 0.16%. Interestingly, however, further tests show that this result is
driven by the Asian, and specifically South-East Asian, economies. If these
countries are excluded from the non-OECD sample, the coefficient on
International students is again non-significant. Regarding the United Kingdom,
the result on the non-OECD sample does not differ significantly from those on
the entire dataset (but the magnitude of the coefficient on International students
linked to non-OECD countries is slightly higher).
The overall magnitude of these effects can now be taken into consideration.
The number of international students from the average country in the United
Kingdom is 1791. Considering the preferred specification, Model 10 in Table 2, a
10% increase in the average number of registered students would amount to an
increase of 179 students per country. The stocks of British investments in the
average foreign country amount to $12,573 million. Then, the 10% increase in
students would lead to a 2.88% increase in the stock of FDI (coefficient on
International students, Model 10), or to an extra value of $362 million. This
means that one additional average student would generate an increase of
$2.02 million of the British stock of FDI in the students’ economy.
As above, the magnitude of the impact of non-OECD students on American
investments abroad can be calculated by considering that a 10% increase in
students from the average non-OECD country (Table 1) amounts to 260 more
students, and that this increase leads to 1.58% more American FDI in the non-
OECD country (Model 5, Table 3). The value of the average United States
investment in the non-OECD country is $3,324.80 (Table 1), and 1.58% of it
is $52.53 million. Hence, an extra student from a non-OECD country generates
an increase in the stock of FDI from the United States in the student’s home
economy of $202,057. This is a significantly lower magnitude than in the
United Kingdom. The difference between the two depends on the smaller
value of the coefficient on International students in the United States regres-
sions, and on its significance being restricted to non-OECD economies, where
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the average value of the American FDI is about twenty times smaller than in
OECD countries (Table 1).6
5.5 Robustness
Results in Table 2 show that students registered in the early seventies still have
a strong effect on United States and United Kingdom FDI, but that the effect on
United States FDI vanishes with the more recent cohorts of students. As a
further check of robustness, I test the effect on FDI of foreign students regis-
tered in United States universities fifteen years after 1970, in 1985, still during
the Cold War period. Results, in Model 1 of Table 4, show that International
students1985 also have a positive and significant impact on the American FDI of
1999–2011. The magnitude of the coefficient is similar to that of International
students1970 (of Table 2). Furthermore, the coefficient is robust to the introduc-
tion of the CIA variable among the covariates, while, as in previous tests, CIA
interventions have no direct effect on FDI (Model 2, Table 4). The coefficient on
the interacted variable International students1985 × CIA, is negative and signifi-
cant, supporting previous findings suggesting that the use of covert power has
a negative influence on international education ties (Model 3). The same test is
performed with students registered during 1993, International students1993, and
results remain overall the same (Models 4–6, Table 4). Year 1993 has been
selected because it is the first in UNESCO statistics registering the new world
order, following the fall of the Berlin wall. These findings provide support to
two previous results: the first is that individuals who studied in American
universities during the Cold War period and immediately after have a positive
and significant effect on the United States’ FDI, an effect that is lost with the
younger cohorts of the last decade. The second is that past CIA interventions
have a disruptive impact on international education ties and a weak or non-
robust direct influence on FDI. Finally, regressions have been rerun by adding
further institutional and cultural covariates, among which the proportion of
people of Christian religion in the partner country, the stocks of immigrants
from it in the United States and United Kingdom and, regarding the United
6 The magnitude of the impact is higher than that of an average business immigrant in the USA
on USA imports ($61,637) in Aleksynska and Peri (2014), or of an average international student
on British imports ($56,028) and exports ($31,430) in Murat (2014), but the average flow of
American and British imports and exports is also several times smaller than the stocks of these
countries’ investments in the average foreign economy.
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Kingdom, the partner country’s status of ex-colony or Commonwealth member.
Results do not change significantly.
6 Conclusions
International education networks’ participants are skilled individuals with a
foreign education and an extremely valuable transnational social capital,
which includes a knowledge on the institutions and culture of the country of
the alma mater. This paper investigated their influence on the investments of the
United States and the United Kingdom during 1999–2011. Proxies for education
networks were international students, alumni associations of American and
British universities in foreign countries, and students who attended university
during the Cold War period.
Table 4: International students in the United States and CIA interventions.
Dependent variable: US outward FDI (OLS)
() () () () () ()
International
students
.*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
International
students ×CIA
-.**
(.)
International
students
.*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
International
students ×CIA
-.**
(.)
CIA . .** .* .**
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations , , , , , ,
R-squared . . . . . .
Notes: All variables are in logs except dummies and percentages. Robust standard errors
clustered by country in parentheses. Time dummies and constant in all regressions. The panel
is an unbalanced panel comprising data between 1999–2011. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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The main findings are that international student ties positively and strongly
influence the investments of British firms in the students’ home countries, while
their impact on American FDI is weaker and restricted to non-OECD economies.
Moreover, even in this restricted sample, the students’ effect on American FDI is
lower than that on British FDI on the entire sample. The coefficient on interna-
tional students on British FDI is 0.28 overall, and 0.45 for the average develop-
ing economy. The same coefficient on students on American FDI to non-OECD
economies is 0.16. Differently, former cohorts of international students, who
attended university in the early seventies, have a similar, positive and strong
impact on both British and American bilateral investments. For the United
States, the stronger effect of former students may be due to the restrictive
policies on students’ visas adopted after 2001. This determined a fall in the
number of international students in American universities and, possibly, on the
effectiveness of their education links. On the other hand, the associations of
alumni abroad, a closest proxy for real networking activity than international
students, attract very substantial amounts of both American and British FDI into
the alumni home countries.
Education networks affect FDI not only through the classical information-
diffusion and behaviour-enforcing mechanisms, but also through the transfer
of social, institutional and economic norms from the host to the origin coun-
try. The recent literature identifies international students as effective channels
of a soft power directed to the elites (Nye 2005). This study included proxies of
international power, such as economic aid, cultural diplomacy, wars, and
covert action to test their direct and combined effects on FDI. Results show
that the interacted effects of international students and other forms of soft
power are mixed, but those between students and hard power, such as wars
and covert action, are always negative: even decades after their occurrence,
wars and CIA interventions disrupt the positive effects of education ties on
FDI. Recent studies emphasise that soft power not backed by hard power can
be totally ineffective (Nye 2005); this paper’s results suggest that hard and
covert power without the contemporary use of persuasion may also be
unsuccessful.
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APPENDIX
Table 5: Top 20 non-OECD countries.
FDI Students Alumni associations
United States
Singapore . China  China 
Brazil . India  India 
Hong Kong . Thailand  Hong Kong 
China . Indonesia  Brazil 
Chile . Brazil  Singapore 
Bahamas . Hong Kong  Thailand 
Argentina . Colombia  Argentina 
Indonesia . Malaysia  Philippines 
Venezuela . Saudi Arabia  United Arab Emirates 
India . Pakistan  Israel 
Malaysia . Kenya  Malaysia 
Thailand . Nepal  Colombia 
Russian Federation . Russian Federation  Saudi Arabia 
Israel . Nigeria  Indonesia 
Philippines . Vietnam  Russian Federation 
Panama . Venezuela  Chile 
Kazakhstan . Jamaica  Pakistan 
Egypt . Singapore  Vietnam 
Saudi Arabia . Philippines  Peru 
Algeria . Peru  South Africa 
United Kingdom
Hong Kong . China  India 
South Africa . India  China 
Singapore . Malaysia  Malaysia 
United Arab Emirates . Hong Kong  Hong Kong 
Russian Federation . Nigeria  Pakistan 
Brazil . Cyprus  Singapore 
India . Pakistan  Nigeria 
China . Singapore  United Arab Emirates 
Argentina . Thailand  Thailand 
Egypt . Saudi Arabia  Cyprus 
Kazakhstan . Kenya  South Africa 
Colombia . Sri Lanka  Kenya 
Malaysia . Zimbabwe  Argentina 
Malta . Russian Federation  Brazil 
(continued )
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Table 5: (continued )
FDI Students Alumni associations
Chile . Ghana  Ghana 
Nigeria . Bangladesh  Mauritius 
Indonesia . United Arab Emirates  Indonesia 
Thailand . Iran  Sri Lanka 
Saudi Arabia . Mauritius  Saudi Arabia 
Mauritius . South Africa  Bangladesh 
Notes: Averages, 1999–2011.
Table 6: Variable definitions and sources.
Variable Definition Source
FDI Outward stocks, in United States $,
millions.
OECD Statistics.
International students Number of students enrolled during
–.
UNESCO Education Statistics
International
students, , 
Number of students enrolled during
,, .
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook
Alumni Alumni groups and associations in
partner countries of graduates,
respectively, from United States or
United Kingdom Universities.
Own databases. Data collected
during  from United States and
United Kingdom Universities’
websites or provided by Central
offices of Alumni associations.
Includes only officially recognized
groups from  United Kingdom
and  United States universities.
GDP In United States $, millions. IMF – Statistics
Population Number of people, millions. IMF – Statistics
Distance Great circle distance between
capital cities and Washington or
London (Km).
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/
bdd_modele/bdd.asp
Inflation Rate of change. IMF – Statistics
Language Proportion of people speaking
English over total population.
Melitz and Toubal () CIA World
Factbook.
Quality of institutions Worldwide Governance Indicator.
Includes six dimensions of
governance: Voice and
accountability Political stability and
absence of violence; Government
effectiveness; Regulatory quality;
Rule of Law; Control of corruption.
World Bank. Developed by
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(). The six indicators are
measured in units ranging from
about –. to ., with higher
values corresponding to better
governance outcomes.
(continued )
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Table 6: (continued )
Variable Definition Source
Free trade agreements United States and European Union
(for the United Kingdom) free trade
agreements with the partner
country.
OECD Statistics
Aid Total Official Flows: The sum of
Official Development Assistance
(ODA) and Other Official Flows(OOF)
represents the total gross
disbursements by the official sector
at large to the recipient country.($
millions)
OECD Statistics
Wars Years of armed conflict between
United States or United Kingdom
and foreign country since .
Correlates of War Project
CIA Number of CIA interventions in
foreign country, –.
Berger et al. () AER database.
British Council Number of British Council branches
in foreign country in .
British Council Annual Report
–. Measuring Success:
http://www.britishcouncil.org/bc-
annual-report--.pdf
Countries: Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia
Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize
Benin Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina
Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Chile China Colombia
Congo, Republic Congo, Dem. Rep Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic
Denmark Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea
Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada
Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq
Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, Republic Kuwait Kyrgyzstan
Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jam Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao
Macedonia FYR Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico
Moldova, Rep. Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New
Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay
Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Lucia Saint
Vincent Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore
Slovak Republic Slovenia Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland
Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Trinidad and
Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United States
Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe.
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